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Chapter 1
Defined Contribution Pensions:
New Opportunities, New Risks
Olivia S. Mitchell and Sylvester J. Schieber
Each month the U.S. financial press reports vast sums of money rushing
into defined contribution (DC) pensions. Pensions known as 401 (k)
plans lead the pack: soon the nation's 401 (k) pension system will amount
to more than $1.5 trillion in assets and will include almost 30 million
private sector employees (EBPR 1996). Recent legislation has extended
the availability of DC plans to the public sector as well, virtually guaran-
teeing rapid growth of this pension type for decades to come.
This tremendous appeal of defined contribution plans in the United
States is attributable to several factors. For some groups, mainly small and
medium-sized employers, there has been a shift away from defined bene-
fit (DB) to DC pensions, a pattern evident in the left panel of Figure I.
After the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974, the number of DB plans with fewer than 100 partici-
pants grew until the early 1980s, then leveled off for a few years, and
declined steadily after 1987. The number of DB plans sponsored by
larger employers, on the other hand, remained relatively constant over
this same period. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that the prevalence of
DC plans in larger firms grew significantly over the period, from slightly
under 9,000 plans in 1975, to over 39,000 plans almost twenty years later.
But the growth by firm size was uneven: while larger companies were
adding 30,000 defined contribution plans, small employers were adding
nearly 400,000 new plans.
Data on numbers of workers participating in DC plans corroborate
these trends. Figure 2 shows the number of participants in private DB and
DC plans segmented by plan size. The left panel of that figure reveals that
participation in DB plans with under 100 participants has been relatively
flat since just after the passage of ERISA: DB participation grew from 1.6
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Figure 1. Trend in number of private defined benefit and defined contribution plans, 1975-93. Source: USDOL
(1996): 60-61.
Figure 2. Trend in number ofparticipanls in private defined benefit and defined contribution plans, 1975-93.
Source: USDOL (1996): 63-64.
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4 New Opportunities. New Risks
million participants in 1975 to 2.2 million participants in 1982, but then
declined to 1.1 million participants by a decade later- below coverage
levels twenty years previously. Participation in larger DB plans grew signif-
icantly during the first decade after the passage of ERISA, but has re-
mained relatively constant since then. By contrast, the right panel of
Figure 2 depicts more positive trends for DC plans. Among both larger
and smaller plans, the last 15 to 20 years have seen significant growth in
the numbers of DC-covered participants. Among smaller employers, a DC
plan is often the only retirement accumulation vehicle offered. Among
larger employers, DC plans are often supplemental in nature, augment-
ing the benefits being provided through traditional DB arrangements.
What are the challenges and opportunities that this DC pension revo-
lution offers? In this volume we take stock of theoretical and empirical
benefits and costs that arise in the DC arena, and we outline some new
concerns as well. This discussion is of critical importance to a wide range
of audiences including potential savers as well as those interested in
helping them save - employers and money managers, policymakers con-
cerned with the health of national retirement income systems, regulators
charged with fashioning a healthy financial system, and members of the
next generation of taxpayers, who are vulnerable to bear the burden of
any shortfalls incurred in retirement savings.
Reasons for Defined Contribution
Retirement Plan Growth
There are several reasons that defined contribution plans have grown so
quickly in the United States and around the world. Probably most impor-
tantly, both plan sponsors and plan participants perceive the DC plan as
"flexible." Employees with a DC plan generally contribute a fraction of
their pay; this fraction is often self-determined and sometimes has an
employer match (the match typically depending on the employee's con-
tribution level). Employees also usually have some say over how these
contributions are to be invested during the accumulation phase.
This flexibility is well illustrated by recent U.S. Department of Labor
data on medium and large private sector firms. As Table 1 shows, the
modal number of investment options permitted in a defined contribu-
tion plan is about four, with a quarter of plan participants eligible for five
or more. In defined benefit plans, by contrast, the plan participant is
promised a retirement benefit payout, but has no control over his or her
plan investments during the worklife. For example, about half of all DC
plan participants can take employer pension contributions when they
leave their firms, and employees remaining on the job are often able to
borrow against their account balances (Table 2). Also the accounts may
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TABLE 1 Savings and Thrift Plans: Trends in Investment Choices for Full-Time
Participants
Empkryee Empluyer
contributions (%) contributions (%)
1991 1993 1991 1993
Empkryees permitted to choose investments 62 86 91 58
Number ofchoices
2 10 12 14 7
3 20 21 29 13
4 16 30 26 17
5 {15 { 136 14 3 18 37+ 6 5
at determinable 3 7 5 7
Types ofinvestments aUawed
Common stock fund 56 68 79 49
Company stock 22 43 46 49
Long term interest bearing securities 29 42 40 28
Diversified stock & bond fund 17 42 24 33
Government securities 21 23 30 14
Guaranteed investment contracts 43 43 65 30
Money market funds 27 26 35 20
Certificates of deposit 1 1 2 1
Other 4 6 4 1
Not determinable 3 3 4 3
Source: USDOL (1991-93).
Nou: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of
rounding.
be withdrawn (albeit with a lax penalty) in the event ofa hardship, often
defined as the purchase of a house, high healthcare bills, or college
expenses. Loans for workers who are currently employed at the pension-
sponsoring firm are virtually unheard of in traditional DB pension plans.
Flexibility at retirement also is appealing to many DC plan partici-
pants. One issue is that participants can decide how much to take in a
lump sum versus how much to annuitize. Almost all participants in pen-
sion plans surveyed are able to take some or all of their funds in a lump
sum (Table 3); half may access their money in installments ifdesired; and
fewer than one-third of DC plan participants may convert their pension
funds to lifetime annuities. This wide range of options contrasts with the
typical pattern in DB plans. where benefits commonly must be paid in the
form of a life annuity.
Recent research on the largest pension plan covering university re-
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TABLE 2 Trends in Provisions for Withdrawal of Employer Contributions Prior to
Retirement, Disability, or Termination of Employment: Savings and
Thrift Plans
Full-time participants (%)
Type offormula 1985 1986 19881 1988 1989 1991 1993
No withdrawals permitted 20 18 29 28 29 50 51
Withdmwals permitted 80 82 71 72 71 50 47
For any reason 61 56 42 41 37 24 29
No penalty 30 19 15 14 17 16 NA
Some penalty 30 37 26 25 18 8 NA
For hardship reasons* 19 26 29 30 34 26 18
No penalty 14 21 21 22 27 17 NA
Some penalty 3 5 6 7 7 7 NA
Source: USDOL (1985-93) and unpublished data from the BLS for 1988t figures. The EBS
sampling frame changed in 1988 to include smaller firms and more industries than before,
so data for 1988 on are not precisely comparable with previous years' tabulations.
*Commonly expressed hardship reasons include purchase or repair of primary residence,
death or illness in the family, education of an immediate family member, or sudden unin-
sured loss.
tin a few cases the Bureau ofLabor Statistics tabulated 1988 results using a sampling frame
similar to that employed in previous years. For comparability purposes these figures have
been presented. where available, under columns headed" 1988," whereas tabulations from
1988 on employ the new, larger survey sampling frame.
Note: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of
rounding. NA means data nOl available.
TABLE 3 Trends in Method of Distribution of Account at Retirement: Savings
and Thrift Plans
Full-ti1TU! participants (%)
Type ofdistribution * 1985 1986 1988 1989 1991 1993
Cash distribution 99 99 97 97 99 99
Lifetime annuity 29 25 25 28 30 30
Installments 59 52 49 52 52 48
Lump sum 99 98 95 96 99 98
Stock distribution NA NA
Source: USDOL (1985-93). The EBS sampling frame changed in 1988 to include smaller
firms and more industries than before, so data for 1988 on are not precisely comparable
with previous years' tabulatlons.
*Many plans offer more than one form of cash distribution, so sums of individual items
exceed total.
Note: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of
rounding. NA means data not available, and "- ,. means less than 0.5 percent.
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TABLE 4 Trends in Employer Contributions in Savings and Thrift Plans
Full-time participants (%)
Employer rnatching* contributions 1985 /986 /988 /989 /99/ 1993
Fraction ofsalar)'
:=;5% 12 28 35 36 39 40
6% 52 54 47 47 43 46
?7% 14 11 11 12 11 15
Specified dollar amount/other 9 7 5 4 3
Source: USDOL (1985-93). The EBS sampling frame changed in 1988 to include smaller
firms and more industries than before. so data for 1988 on are not precisely comparable
with previous years' tabulations.
*Ernployces may contribute a percentage of salary lip to a maximum; ceilings on employer
matchinK contributions are generaJly lower.
Nole: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of
rounding.., -" means less than 0.5 percenl.
search and teaching faculty (the TIAA-CREF plan) suggests that patterns
of retirement payouts are changing in important ways over time, with
rising demand for 10- and 20-year certain payout periods (Hammond,
this volume). In general, then, employees with DC plans find appealing
the degree of leeway they have over the amount of money paid in, the
investment options during the build-up phase, and the way the funds may
be paid out.
A different appeal of DC plans is the fact that employers are able to
target their matching contributions to reward specific behaviors and spe-
cific types of employees. A typical DC pension design has the employer
depositing up to 5 percent of an employee's pay into the DC pension if
that worker contributes the maximum allowed (Table 4). However, ifan
employee chooses not to contribute, or contributes less than the max-
imum allowed, the company will generally contribute less as well. The
same pattern is evident with company contributions to profit-sharing
plans, where payments are increasingly determined by participants' con-
tributions, rather than by pay levels (Table 5). This approach is probably
designed to allow the employer to effectively pay more to those workers
willing to save more - a practice explained by Richard Ippolito (this vol-
ume) as making sense when saving behavior signals greater productivity
potential. Having the match feature in the pension plan allows more
productive employees to be rewarded accordingly.
Economists generally agree that employers' costs associated with the
sponsorship of retirement plans are part of the total cost of labor. That is,
an employer must pay the worker his or her marginal value to the firm,
whether in the form of cash or deferred compensation. Richard Ippolito
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TABLE 5 Trends in Provision of Deferred Profit Sharing Plans
Full-time participants (%)
Type ojJormula 1986 1988 1989 1991 1993
Employer contributions
Based on stated formula 59 55 60 52 40
Fixed % of profi ts NA 16 10 10 9
Variable % of profits NA 12 18 { 24 32
Other formulas NA 27 33 17
No formula 41 45 40 48 60
Allocation ojProfits to employees
Equally to all I I I 2 7
Based on earnings 61 74 64 52 52
Based on earnings and service 10 12 9 13 II
Based on participants' contributions 12 19
Other 8 13 26 21 II
Loans from employees' accounts
Permitted 25 32 19 27 23
Not permitted 75 68 81 73 77
Source: USDOL (1985-93). The EBS sampling frame changed in 1988 to include smaller
firms and more industries than before, so data for 1988 on are not precisely comparable
with previous years' tabulations.
Note: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of
rounding. "- ,. means less than 0.5 percent.
argues that this translates into differential economic rewards for dif-
ferent workers when the company offers a defined contribution pension
plan with matching options. In particular, some workers, particularly the
very present-oriented (or "high discounters" in Ippolito's terminology),
do not participate in a voluntary contributory defined contribution plan
even though they forgo the value of the tax benefit or employer match
accorded such contributions. This is sensible when the company feels
that the high discounter may not be workers that such firms wish to
compensate highly in the first place - perhaps because they exhibit be-
haviors associated with relatively low marginal productivity or perhaps
because they impose relatively high maintenance costs on the company.l
One of the issues that Ippolito leaves unexplored is whether or not
high discounters could, under some circumstances, be converted into
low discounters. Other writers in this volume show that improvements in
financial education could go a long way to encouraging greater saving on
the part of workers (Bernheim, this volume). Likewise, increased em-
ployer matching of employee contributions in 401 (k) plans and more
intense communications programs can increase levels of participation in
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voluntary contributory programs (Clark and Schieber, this volume). This
research, then, suggests that some workers are high discounters simply
because they are ignorant of the long-term costs that short-term con-
sumption decisions may imply. Of course other younger, lower-wage
workers may lack the wherewithal to save, which remains a challenge for
the economy as a whole.
An additional explanation for DC plans' popularity is that they are
often perceived as less expensive than the defined benefit alternative.
Data from the U.S. Department of Labor show that joint employer/
employee contribution rates in DC plans are widely variable, ranging in
practice from I to 16 percent of pay (Table 5). Obviously it is possible to
design DB plans that would mimic these cost ranges, so it is not neces-
sarily the case that DC plans are less expensive to operate. On the other
hand, administrative costs associated with DC plans are generally lower
than those of DB plans, making a given dollar of contribution go farther
toward retirement payments. For instance, in 1996, annual administra-
tive expenses in 1996 were $287 per participant in small DC plans while
similar-sized DB costs exceeded $600 per participant (Hustead, this vol-
ume). For a large DC pension plan, administrative costs were approx-
imately $49, and for DB plans they were $68 per year in 1996. (These cost
data exclude investment management fees, but include mandatory gov-
ernment insurance premiums for the defined benefit pension plans.)
Edwin Hustead's analysis in this volume shows that the cost ofadminister-
ing defined benefit plans rose steadily during the 1980s, both in absolute
terms and in relation to the cost ofadministering a defined contribution
plan as a result of various legislative and regulatory measures adopted
during that time. These increases in per capita administration costs were
much more significant for smaller defined benefit plans than for larger
ones. In addition to increasing administrative costs, the value of the tax
advantages accorded the sponsors of many small defined benefit plans
were substantially eroded during the 1980s. For many smaller defined
benefit plans, the economic value of continuing them was simply not
worth the cost of so doing.
As a factor explaining their rising popularity over time, proponents of
DC plans have often pointed out that these plans are less risky than the
DB plan alternative. For instance, in the United States, DC plan assets are
owned by plan participants and held in trust, leaving little potential for
loss in the event of corporate sponsor bankruptcy. By contrast, a defined
benefit plan could find itself with assets inadequate to meet promised
obligations, the condition known as underfunding. In the United States,
at least, DB plan underfunding risk is partially covered by a government
insurance group, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, though at a
nontrivial premium cost noted above. In other countries, underfunding
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risk is handled in different ways (Bodie, Mitchell, and Turner, 1997) and
in any event this risk arises only in the DB pension plan scenario, not in
the DC environment.
Do Defined Contribution Plans Offer Reasons
for Concern?
Having explained why DC plans are growing in popularity, we should also
note concerns about this trend. One factor is that defined contribution
pension plans tend to place a great deal of responsibility on participants'
shoulders, more so than in the case of DB pensions. For example, em-
ployees offered a DC plan sometimes do not avail themselves of the
chance to save in a tax-qualified account (Hinz and Turner, this volume).
In addition, people who save more in their DC account may offset these
funds with less saving outside their pension account. Nevertheless, em-
pirical studies using nationally representative cross-section data from the
United States are hard-pressed to detect a large and statistically signifi-
cant result confirming this hypothesis (Gale and Milano, this volume).
Failure to participate in a tax-qualified pension plan may be a rational
economic decision for workers who are particularly income-eonstrained.
On the other hand, for many, nonparticipation may be due to myopia or
lack of information. Data from several large firms show that the amount
and quality of pension information provided to participants by the em-
ployer has a powerful effect on pension participation rates, in many cases
even more potent than additional employer funds spent in matching
employee contributions (Clark and Schieber, this volume). Clearly there
is more to be learned about how to interest workers covered by a pension
to actually participate in the plan.
Even when employees do join their company's plan, they are often
poorly informed about investment options, a condition that may lead
them to make seemingly unwise or irrational portfolio choice decisions.
Surveys of average Americans document workers' substantial ignorance
about key aspects of financial markets, raising profound questions about
how ready workers are to make DC investment choices with lifelong con-
sequences (Bernheim, this volume). One instance where questions are
raised is when workers are found to be investing in substantial quantities
ofemployer stock, perhaps under an incentive plan offered by the corpo-
rate sponsor. This investment pattern is not, per se, problematic though
it suggests that employees may not fully understand the benefits of port-
folio diversification. Another study, by Andrea Kusko et al. (this volume),
reveals remarkable worker insensitivity to dramatic changes in employer
contributions.
A related issue salient in many plan sponsors' minds of late is that of
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potential liability if employee investments in a DC plan fail to perform
well. This concern has recently resurfaced when a guaranteed investment
contract (GIC) was offered as one of several investment options to par-
ticipants in a large employer's 401 (k) pension plan. After the insurance
company issuing the GIC filed for bankruptcy, pension plan participants
sued the large employer, charging it with having selected an investment
option that lost money (Ortelere, this volume). This case and others have
prompted the U.S. Department of Labor to issue guidelines regarding
pension investments that employers hope will clarifY their responsibility
toward participants in company-sponsored DC pension plans.
As a result of these issues, pension education is becoming increasingly
important to sponsors of DC plans. Participants vary according to the
types of information they need and can process regarding investment
risk, return, and related issues. Examining alternative approaches to pen-
sion education reveals that the way pension information is presented can
have a large impact on pension plan members' investment behavior. For
example, 401 (k) plan participants tend to hold much of their money in
bonds, but appear to move funds to equities after learning more about
the relative risk and return of alternative portfolios (Vanderhei and
Bajtelsmidt, 1997). A related concern is whether unsophisticated inves-
tors are likely to overreact when the market falls, manipulating their
pension funds to inadvertently lock in short-term losses when a better
strategy would be to invest for the long term. Available evidence suggests
that mutual fund investors have been rather unresponsive to large down-
ward movements experienced in the market to date, and since many
401 (k) pension plans are invested in mutual funds, it seems likely that
this pattern will also carryover to the DC environment (Rea and Marcis,
this volume).
Several implications flow from increased understanding of how plan
participants make decisions about their pensions. One is that industry is
growing more aware of how to communicate with employees effectively
about their pensions. More forward-looking and technologically ad-
vanced firms are exploring the multi-media route, using the Internet and
financial-planning software libraries. Other firms use videos and glossy
materials, along with around-the-clock toll-free telephone service to an-
swer participant questions and permit changes in invesUnent decisions.
As a result, many plan sponsors find their role changing over time as plan
participants interact directly with the customer service representative at
the pension investment house, rather than channeling pension questions
through their corporation's benefits manager (Hurt, this volume). And
benefi ts consulting firms as well as third-party plan administrators are
facing new challenges related to delivering better benefits service at the
retail level.
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The Road Ahead
The rapid growth of defined contribution pension plans in the United
States and around the world offers new opportunities and also new risks.
As we show in this volume, DC plans serve both participating employees
and sponsoring employers. In the process, they are working to educate a
new generation of pension savers. This transition process is far from fool-
proof, however, and diligent oversight is needed to protect retirement
assets from unwise investment behavior, premature cash outs, and ex-
cessive administrative expenses. This volume illustrates how exciting re-
search advances can be used to inform improved decision making about
pension design, particularly for defined contribution plans, in the future.
Note
I. Such a worker also would undervalue the possibility of defined benefit pen-
sion at some distant future time, and hence would be unlikely to stay with an
employer that is reducing current cash wages for the traditional pension offering.
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